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Abstract 35 
Impairments in social cognition and perspective-taking play an important role in the 36 
psychopathology and social functioning of individuals with social anxiety, autism or 37 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, among other clinical presentations. Perspective-taking has 38 
mostly been studied using the concept of Theory of Mind (ToM), which describes the 39 
sequential development of these skills in young children, as well as clinical populations 40 
experiencing perspective-taking difficulties. Several studies mention positive results of 41 
Theory of Mind based training programs, however, the precise processes involved in the 42 
achievement of these improvements are difficult to determine. Relational Frame Theory 43 
(RFT) is a modern behavioural account of complex cognitive functions, and is argued to 44 
provide a more precise approach to the assessment and training of perspective-taking, among 45 
other relational skills. Results of RFT-based studies of perspective-taking in developmental 46 
and clinical settings are discussed. The development of training methods targeting 47 
perspective-taking deficits from an RFT point of view appears to provide promising 48 
applications for the enhancement of current treatments of people with social-cognitive 49 
dysfunctions. 50 
Key words: Schizophrenia – Autism – Social cognition – Perspective-taking – Relational 51 
Frame Theory    52 
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1. Social cognition 53 
Social cognition has long been a focus in social, cognitive and clinical psychology. Its 54 
importance is not surprising given that social cognition allows us to select, interpret and use 55 
social information (Aronson and Wilson 2005), and that these in turn are critical to our 56 
understanding of self and others, the wider social context and how we can relate to these. It is 57 
equally well established that perspective-taking skills are central to social cognition, given 58 
that they enable us to distinguish between mental states of self and others, and to take the 59 
perspective of another. Indeed, perspective-taking is a pre-requisite for many aspects of 60 
complex social interaction, including empathy, irony, humour and deception (Barnes-Holmes 61 
2001; Heagle and Rehfeldt 2006).  62 
Given the centrality of perspective-taking in social cognition, individuals with 63 
problems in the former naturally display a broad range of problems in the latter (Martin Brüne 64 
and Brüne-Cohrs 2006; Couture, Penn, and Roberts 2006). For example, individuals with a 65 
diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are well-known for impairments in mental state 66 
attribution, social reciprocity, emotion perception and empathy, all of which negatively affect 67 
social interaction and communication (American Psychiatric Association and Association 68 
2000; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, and Cohen 2000; Yirmiya et al. 1996).  69 
It was suggested by Frith (1992) that similar deficits occur in individuals with a 70 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and account, to some extent, for characteristic features of social 71 
functioning that are observed in both positive and negative symptoms. Specifically, 72 
impairments in discriminating the mental states of the self and others may contribute to 73 
hallucinations and delusions, as well as the absence of meaningful social interaction. 74 
Furthermore, Hardy-Baylé (1994) argued that deficits in mental state attribution are 75 
associated with thought disorganisation and the inability to abstract contextual information 76 
regarding social behaviour. At the present time, there is a well-supported body of evidence 77 
from social-cognitive studies to suggest that individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 78 
show impairments in mental state attribution (Corcoran, Mercer, and Frith 1995; Sprong et al. 79 
2007) and perspective-taking (Langdon, Coltheart, Ward & Catts, 2001; Villatte, Monestès, 80 
McHugh, Freixa i Baqué & Loas, 2010a), even during phases of remission (Bora, Yucel, and 81 
Pantelis 2009).  82 
During acute psychotic phases, treatment of schizophrenia mainly targets 83 
hallucinations and delusions through pharmacological means, with some short-term success 84 
(Slooff, Withaar, and Luijten 2006). However, life-long medication is often recommended 85 
(Davis 2006; Kissling 1991) and significant concerns with this type of regime surround the 86 
many unpleasant side effects observed (e.g. extrapyramidal symptoms, hypotension and 87 
intestinal complaints) and problems with medication compliance (Slooff, Withaar, and Luijten 88 
2006). Some of these side effects have been reduced with the development of second-89 
generation antipsychotic drugs, and improvements in negative symptoms have been reported  90 
(Woo et al. 2009). Still, pharmacological regimes that focus primarily on the suppression of 91 
positive symptoms leave impairments in social functioning and perspective-taking untouched. 92 
Psychosocial treatment focusing on these factors, therefore, complements current treatments 93 
of schizophrenia (Kern et al. 2009; Woo et al. 2009).  94 
Given the pivotal role of perspective-taking in social functioning, it is not surprising 95 
that many other clinical categories that include social impairments also present with 96 
difficulties in perspective-taking or mental state attribution. Results from social-cognitive 97 
studies indicate that these include schizotypy (Langdon and Coltheart 1999; Langdon et al. 98 
2001; Pickup 2006; Platek et al. 2003), frontotemporal dementia (Gregory et al. 2002), brain 99 
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damage/degenerative brain disease (for an overview see Brüne, 2005), alcohol use disorder 100 
(Uekermann and Daum 2008), cocaine use disorder (Hulka et al. 2013; Hulka et al. 2015; 101 
Preller et al. 2014; Preller et al. 2014), borderline personality disorder (Sharp et al. 2015; 102 
Herpertz and Bertsch 2014), depression (Ladegaard et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2005; Wang et al. 103 
2008), anxiety (Bodner, Aharoni, and Iancu 2012; Samson et al. 2012) and obsessive 104 
compulsive disorder (Sayin et al. 2010). As a result, perspective-taking skills are of pivotal 105 
importance to many domains in clinical research and practice. 106 
2. Perspective-taking 107 
The dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of perspective-taking is Theory of 108 
Mind (ToM). Originally described by Premack and Woodruff (1978), ToM refers to the 109 
ability to infer the beliefs, intentions, thoughts and emotions of the self and others, and 110 
advocates of the theory have described the natural trajectory of these skills from simple to 111 
complex perspective-taking (Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin 1999). In typical 112 
development, perspective-taking skills are believed to be fully developed by around age six, 113 
although some evidence suggests that these repertoires remain somewhat inflexible even until 114 
late adolescence or early adulthood (Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore 2010; Keysar, Lin, 115 
and Barr 2003).  116 
Many theoretical accounts have been proposed within ToM research (Ensink and 117 
Mayes 2010). As the most prevalent account of ToM, Premack and Woodruff (1978) 118 
proposed that ToM can be viewed as a theory that children develop about others’ minds, also 119 
referred to as the theory-theory account (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Astington and Gopnik 120 
1991). Simulation theorists, on the other hand, argue that people identify with another 121 
person’s perspective and are, thereby, able to simulate his/her experience (Harris et al. 1989). 122 
Proponents of nativistic accounts state that ToM is a result of innate processes in the brain, 123 
and that the development of these skills is dependent on the maturation of these mechanisms 124 
(for an overview see Ensink and Mayes 2010). Indeed, results from neuroimaging studies 125 
indicate that specific areas of the brain (temporal lobes, inferior parietal cortex, frontal lobes) 126 
may be involved in ToM (Martin Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs 2006). Evidence also suggests that 127 
“mirror neurons” play a part in the development of these skills (Mayes et al. 2009). This 128 
specific type of neuron is activated both during an action and during observation of that same 129 
action in another person, and is therefore argued to be of importance in imitation and 130 
understanding of intentions (Ensink and Mayes 2010). Furthermore, ToM skills have been 131 
linked to executive function (e.g. Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai 1995; Perner and Lang 2000). 132 
As a mainstream developmental approach to perspective-taking, ToM has substantial 133 
descriptive and conceptual merit, and was the first to offer a coherent account of the putative 134 
components of these pivotal skills. In addition, evidence supports the application of these 135 
concepts through remedial interventions, either aimed at ToM specifically or as a part of 136 
broader training in social cognition. For example, Fisher and Happé (2005) reported 137 
improvements in ToM performance in children diagnosed with ASD, while Gevers and 138 
colleagues (2006) described similar outcomes with children with a pervasive developmental 139 
disorder (Gevers et al. 2006). ToM skills have also been successfully trained in adults with 140 
high-functioning autism (Turner-Brown et al. 2008). Positive results for social cognitive ToM 141 
training were found as well in patients with schizophrenia; for an extensive overview see 142 
Brüne and Juckel (2010) or Horan, Kern, Green and Penn (2008). Although these positive 143 
clinical outcomes are promising, it is difficult to determine precisely the processes of 144 
perspective-taking that are being enhanced during training. That is, the middle-level and 145 
higher-level concepts employed in ToM (e.g. mental state attribution and social cognition) do 146 
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not directly specify psychological or behavioural processes. So while one might realistically 147 
assume, as the evidence suggests, that perspective-taking and social cognition more broadly 148 
operate through similar processes or mechanisms, neither concept “explains” what those 149 
mechanisms are. This conceptual shortfall not only limits our understanding of these skills in 150 
normative development and that which underpins clinical presentations, but also restricts the 151 
development of research methodologies and interventions. In the section below, the paper 152 
explores an alternative approach to understanding perspective-taking that emanates directly 153 
from Relational Frame Theory (RFT), a modern behavioural account of human language and 154 
cognition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche 2001).  155 
3. Relational Frame Theory 156 
3.1 Key concepts. As one would expect from a behavioural theory, RFT concerns 157 
itself with the interactions between an organism and the environment, and the account is in 158 
this respect also philosophically contextual and functional. In short, RFT proposes that 159 
language and cognition primarily involve a learning process known as arbitrarily applicable 160 
relational responding (AARR). In short, complex and subtle contextual cues in the 161 
environment facilitate the derivation of arbitrary relations among stimuli or events. For 162 
example, if a speaker says “apples are like oranges,” the phrase “is like” acts as a contextual 163 
cue for the listener to derive a relation of similarity, or co-ordination, between apples and 164 
oranges. In addition, the words “apples” and “oranges” themselves are co-ordinated with the 165 
actual fruits symbolised by the words. Cognitive development is believed to involve the 166 
emergence of elaborate and complex networks of these relations (Blackledge 2003), which we 167 
use in complex cognitive functions like problem-solving, humour and perspective-taking. For 168 
example, understanding metaphor is believed to involve relating relational networks to other 169 
relational networks (Foody et al., 2014).
 170 
Empirical evidence on RFT across several decades supports the theory’s core concept 171 
of arbitrarily applicable relational responding (i.e. deriving relations) and indicates that these 172 
complex skills proliferate in the absence of direct training (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche 173 
2001). Furthermore, studies have identified a number of families of relational frames (i.e., 174 
patterns of relating) that share the same core processes but have different formal features. 175 
These may be summarised as: co-ordination (i.e. similarity or sameness); distinction 176 
(difference); opposition; comparison; hierarchy; and perspective-taking (known in RFT as 177 
deictic relations). There is also a growing body of evidence on the relationship between these 178 
skills and: language/higher cognition; IQ; developmental delays; and other clinical 179 
presentations (e.g. schizophrenia and social anxiety). For a recent book-length review of this 180 
evidence, see Dymond and Roche (2013). 181 
3.2. The RFT account of perspective-taking. For RFT, the deictic or perspective-182 
taking relations lie at the very heart of language, complex cognition and a sense of self, 183 
because they comprise the constant perspective from which a verbally sophisticated individual 184 
interprets his/her environment. Specifically, the theory proposes three types of perspective-185 
taking relations: the interpersonal relations of I and YOU; the spatial relations of HERE and 186 
THERE; and the temporal relations of NOW and THEN.  Indeed, these concepts are highly 187 
similar to those widely used in the developmental literature and the specific literature on the 188 
concept of self (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, and Dymond 2001; Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and 189 
Hadwin 1999).  190 
According to RFT, we learn to derive deictic relations across everyday questions such 191 
as “What are you doing there?” and “What was it like yesterday?” That is, common social 192 
interactions create a history in which specific words come to function as contextual cues for 193 
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deriving the perspective-taking relations in a given context. Furthermore, the interpersonal, 194 
spatial and temporal relations interact with each other in various ways, thereby adding both 195 
complexity and constancy to our perspectives. For example, I always operates from the HERE 196 
and NOW, and from that perspective YOU/OTHERS are always anchored THERE and 197 
THEN. For RFT, these behaviours of relating comprise core features of one’s sense of self, as 198 
well as one’s sense of others. 199 
Early empirical investigations of the perspective-taking relations, in RFT work with 200 
young children, has explored whether the three types of relations are in fact functionally 201 
distinct from one another, hence each constituting a valid functional concept. With this 202 
purpose, Barnes-Holmes (2001) developed an extensive protocol exploring the three relations 203 
and how they interact with one another at different levels (see Table 1 for a detailed overview 204 
of the trial types). For example, in a simple I-YOU trial, a child was asked to imagine a 205 
scenario in which “I have a green brick and you have a red brick” and was then asked “Which 206 
brick do I/you have?” This trial simply gauges whether the child can respond correctly on the 207 
basis of I versus YOU (i.e. whether the words “I” and “you” control the appropriate 208 
perspectives). Simple HERE-THERE trials follow a similar hypothetical format: “I am sitting 209 
here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. Where am I sitting? Where 210 
are you sitting?” And the research also investigated simple NOW-THEN relations. However, 211 
in order to gauge whether the child can respond correctly on the basis of NOW versus THEN, 212 
the early research parsed out I and YOU trials to circumvent problems in derivation. For 213 
example, if I say “Yesterday I was reading, today you are watching tv,” you will not have 214 
enough information to derive either what I am doing today or what you were doing yesterday. 215 
This problem only applies to NOW-THEN relations. However, it is important to note that 216 
neither spatial nor temporal relations have meaning without an interpersonal perspective from 217 
which to determine them (i.e. there is no “here” or “now” without I).   218 
While these three types of deictic relations already show considerable complexity, 219 
particularly in the ways in which they interact with each other, Barnes-Holmes (2001) 220 
demonstrated even greater complexity by reversing and further integrating the three relations.  221 
In short, trials were created to assess the extent to which children were capable of taking the 222 
perspective of another (e.g. reversing the functions of “I” and “you”). Being able to do this 223 
would likely indicate some level of relational flexibility. Indeed, complex social interactions 224 
are embedded within the need to see the world as someone else sees it, without losing our 225 
own perspective. Other variations in the protocol include reversed HERE-THERE and NOW-226 
THEN relations, as well as two simultaneously reversed deictic relations, thus increasing 227 
complexity and interaction between relations even further. While these types of complex 228 
relational tasks would be rarely required in natural language, there may be instances, for 229 
example in complex logic, where one would need the flexibility to be able to separate the 230 
relations in this way.  231 
The findings from the original research, and much subsequently, have indicated clear 232 
functional distinctions among the three perspective-taking relations and among the three 233 
levels of relational complexity (simple, reversed and double reversed). For example, 234 
participants of almost all ages show competence on I-YOU relations, poorer performances on 235 
HERE-THERE relations, and weaker still performances on NOW-THEN relations (McHugh, 236 
Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes 2004). Furthermore, they show some competence on 237 
simple relations, poorer performances on reversed relations and even poorer performances on 238 
double reversals. The evidence also suggests a developmental trend in the emergence of 239 
perspective-taking skills according to these sequences, which is in line with the 240 
developmental literature more broadly (Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin 1999). Similarly, 241 
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correlational analyses suggest at least some potential overlap between the processes 242 
underpinning both relational perspective-taking and ToM (Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, 243 
Freixa i Baqué & Loas, 2008; Villatte et al., 2010a).   244 
 3.3. The role of deictic relations in clinical samples. Following the early 245 
developmental RFT studies on perspective-taking, the Barnes-Holmes protocol has been 246 
administered in several clinical samples known for their perspective-taking difficulties and 247 
interesting patterns of results have been observed.  For example, children with ASD have 248 
been found to have lower accuracies than their typically-developing peers, especially 249 
regarding deictic reversals (Rehfeldt et al. 2007). McGuinness (2005) administered the 250 
protocol to nine participants diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, and found diminished 251 
performances on both reversed and double-reversed trials. Furthermore, Villatte and 252 
colleagues (2010a) found lower accuracies on the deictic protocol with individuals with a 253 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, when compared to a control group. Again, these difficulties were 254 
mainly recorded in the reversal trials (Villatte et al., 2010a). Evidence of impaired flexibility 255 
in deictic responding has also been recorded in participants categorised as high in social 256 
anhedonia, in this case on double reversal trials (Villatte et al. 2008). Also, lower accuracies 257 
on reversal trials have been found with individuals experiencing social anxiety (Janssen et al. 258 
2014). Difficulties in responding to deictic relations may result in problems in other areas of 259 
social cognition as well. For example, in a similar relational protocol, Villatte and colleagues 260 
found that people with schizophrenia or high social anhedonia were less accurate in 261 
attributing true or false beliefs to another (Villatte et al. 2010). Vilardaga (2009) also argued 262 
that empathy could be understood by examining deictic perspective-taking relations. Similar 263 
to more cognitive accounts of empathy (Lamm, Batson, and Decety 2007), he emphasizes the 264 
importance of being able to define the origin of the expected feelings, or in RFT terms, of 265 
being able to accurately distinguish between one’s own perspective (I-here-now) and what is 266 
spoken about (there-then).  267 
Taken together, it is interesting that the relational protocol has shown precise deficits 268 
in perspective-taking in samples, whose diagnoses are characterised by difficult social 269 
relationships. Furthermore, the combined results of these studies (based on visual inspection 270 
of the data) show that these clinical samples generally perform best on I-YOU trials, followed 271 
by NOW-THEN trials, with poorer performances on HERE-THERE trials. That is, while 272 
these individuals appear to experience more difficulties in complex perspective-taking, the 273 
data also indicates possible differences in the development of perspective-taking relations 274 
compared to non-clinical populations. These results are consistent with the Hardy-Baylé 275 
model of schizophrenia as well, as they indicate that processing of spatial-temporal contextual 276 
information in social interaction is deficient in people with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders 277 
(Sarfati and Hardy-Baylé 1999; Hardy-Bayle 1994).  278 
3.4. Remediating deficits in deictic relations. Currently, one area of RFT research is 279 
focusing on the remediation of these deficits as observed in various clinical samples. 280 
Specifically, several studies with typically-developing children have already highlighted the 281 
utility of combining the original protocol trials with feedback as a successful means of 282 
establishing the target relational performances. For example, McHugh and colleagues (2008) 283 
demonstrated how these perspective-taking skills were successfully facilitated or established 284 
in small samples of young children (McHugh 2004; Barnes-Holmes 2001). Similar studies 285 
have found that these effects also generalise to natural language (Heagle and Rehfeldt 2006; 286 
Weil, Hayes, and Capurro 2011). Overall, these results indicate that deictic relations can be 287 
successfully trained when they are deficient, and results from a few recent studies suggest that 288 
the same principles apply to clinical populations experiencing perspective-taking difficulties. 289 
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In one of these studies, Jackson and colleagues (2014) successfully trained deictic relational 290 
responding in three children with an autism spectrum disorder, although generalisation to 291 
ToM performance was not found (Jackson, Mendoza, and Adams 2014). The authors of that 292 
work suggested that a more extensive training protocol, targeting each perspective-taking 293 
relation separately in each level of complexity, might benefit learning outcomes with this 294 
population and help to improve generalisation to ToM skills. Improvements in relational 295 
perspective-taking were also found in a study by Lovett and Rehfeldt (2014), who trained 296 
three adolescents with Asperger’s syndrome. O’Neill and Weil (2014) studied the effects of a 297 
similar training programme in three patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and found 298 
improvements in deictic responding. Furthermore, all participants showed some 299 
improvements in ToM performance (O’Neill and Weil 2014). In another study, the current 300 
authors are examining the effectiveness of relational perspective-taking training in samples 301 
with social anxiety, with initial unpublished results showing increased performances on these 302 
types of trials. In short, existing results suggest that perspective-taking can be successfully 303 
trained in clinical samples, and may thus potentially provide promising applications to benefit 304 
current treatments.  305 
4. Conclusions 306 
Thus far, RFT research has been able to determine precisely and functionally the 307 
components that comprise perspective-taking; has allowed for a detailed developmental 308 
profile of these skills from early childhood until adulthood; and has identified several 309 
populations experiencing difficulties in this area. Results of some initial RFT studies have 310 
suggested that perspective-taking can be trained and generalised successfully by combining 311 
deictic relational trials with feedback, and these principles are currently being examined in 312 
clinical populations experiencing perspective-taking difficulties. This type of research not 313 
only helps to clarify the key role of perspective-taking in social cognitive functioning, but also 314 
provides practical methods of relational training to complement current treatments of (social 315 
cognitive) psychopathology.  316 
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